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Each year, millions of taxpayers in the United States voluntarily
disclose the most intimate details of their private lives to the Internal
Revenue Service ("IRS").' A government official can glean, among
other things, a taxpayer's name, social security number, marital
status, income, and religious and political affiliations from a tax re-
turn's attachments and completed schedules.2 Despite the plethora of
private information supplied to the IRS, prior to the enactment of the
Tax Reform Act of 1976,3 Internal Revenue Code ("I.R.C.") § 61034
stated that a taxpayer's tax return was a "public record" and as such
was "open to inspection only upon order of the President and under
rules and regulations prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate and
approved by the President.'
The lack of protection afforded to returns and return informa-
tion resulted in the widespread misuse of what taxpayers believed was
confidential information.6 These abuses took the forms of the unau-
thorized use of tax information for political purposes by presidential
* J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1998; M.B.A., I.I.T.-Stuart School of Business,
1998; B.A., Miami University, 1994. The author wishes to thank Professor Nancy R. Livingston
for her guidance and support in the writing of this note and John C. Connery, Jr., Marilyn J.
Chimes, and Carrie M. Raver for their thoughtful suggestions and editing.
1. See S. Doc. No. 94-266, at 827-28 (1975).
2. See id. at 827. The report notes that a taxpayer reveals his or her name, address, social
security number, marital status, and dependents simply by answering the first seven questions
on an individual income tax return. As the taxpayer affixes more attachments, "the more vul-
nerable he becomes." Id.
3. See Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202, 90 Stat. 1520, 1667 (1976) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 6103 (1994)).
4. All Code Section references are to the Internal Revenue Code as amended 1994.
5. I.R.C. § 6103(a)(1) (1971) (amended 1976). The statute, regulations, and executive or-
ders enumerated many specific circumstances that enabled federal agencies to access tax re-
turns. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 313 (1976).
6. See S. Doc. No. 94-266, at 828, 830-32.
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administrations 7 and the authorized use of tax information by gov-
ernmental agencies other than the IRS.8 However, it was not until the
Watergate scandal that these governmental abuses were thrust into
the public limelight.9 The Watergate investigation led to allegations
that President Nixon had used return information for unauthorized
purposes ° and sought to use IRS audits and investigations for politi-
cal purposes.1
In response to these misuses of tax information and their poten-
tial effect on the voluntary assessment system,'12 Congress amended
I.R.C. § 6103.13 The amended version of § 6103 states that return and
return information 14 ("tax information") shall be confidential and
7. See DAVID BURNHAM, A LAW UNTO ITSELF: POWER, POLITICS, AND THE IRS 226-54
(1989). During the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration, even an inquiry by First Lady
Eleanor Roosevelt resulted in "a tax investigation with significant political overtones." Id. at
236. The subject of the investigation was Frank Gannett, a conservative newspaper publisher,
vice chairman of the Republican National Committee, and a critic of the Roosevelt administra-
tion. See id. Mrs. Roosevelt forwarded a story to the treasury secretary that alleged that the
trustees of Cornell University had "used $400,000 of the university's tax-exempt endowment
fund to help Gannett purchase the Binghamton Press and thus prevented the establishment of a
liberal paper in the upstate New York area." Id. at 237. The inquiry by Mrs. Roosevelt led to an
immediate investigation by the treasury; the tax-exempt status of Cornell was not affected. See
id. at 237-38.
8. See S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 317 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3746.
9. See BURNHAM, supra note 7, at 254.
10. See H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 3 (1974).
11. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON INTERNAL REVENUE TAXATION, 93D CONG.,
INVESTIGATION INTO CERTAIN CHARGES OF THE USE OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
FOR POLITICAL PURPOSES (1973).
12. See S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 317, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747.
13. See Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202, 90 Stat. 1667 (1976) (codified as amended at I.R.C.
§ 6103 (1994)).
14. See I.R.C. § 6103(a). Return and return information are both defined broadly by the
Code. A return is defined as
any tax or information return, declaration of estimated tax, or claim for refund re-
quired by, or provided for or permitted under, the provisions of this title which is filed
with the Secretary by, on behalf of, or with respect to any person, and any amendment
or supplement thereto, including supporting schedules, attachments, or lists which are
supplemental to, or part of, the return so filed.
Id. § 6103(b)(1). Return information is defined as
(A) a taxpayer's identity, the nature, source, or amount of his income, payments,
receipts, deductions, exemptions, credits, assets, liabilities, net worth, tax liability, tax
withheld, deficiencies, overassessments, or tax payments, whether the taxpayer's return
was, is being, or will be examined or subject to other investigation or processing, or any
other data, received by, recorded by, prepared by, furnished to, or collected by the
Secretary with respect to a return or with respect to the determination of the existence,
or possible existence, of liability (or the amount thereof) of any person under this title
for any tax, penalty, interest, fine, forfeiture, or other imposition, or offense, and
(B) any part of any written determination or any background file document relat-
ing to such written determination (as such terms are defined in section 6110(b)) which
is not open to public inspection under section 6110 ....
Id. § 6103(b)(2)(A)-(B).
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shall not be disclosed except in thirteen specific circumstances.15 Vio-
lations of this prohibition may result in criminal sanctions under
§ 721316 and civil sanctions under § 7431.1
These necessary amendments, however, have not silenced the
controversy surrounding § 6103.18 Section 6103's thirteen exceptions
do not contain an exception for tax information that is part of a public
record. This omission forced several of the Federal Courts of Appeal
to consider the question of whether an authorized disclosure of tax
information that subsequently becomes part of a public record loses
its § 6103 protection. 19 In order to resolve this question, the Federal
15. The exceptions, listed in I.R.C. § 6103(c)-(o), allow disclosure only under specific cir-
cumstances and for specific purposes. The IRS may disclose tax information (1) to a designee of
taxpayer; (2) to state tax officials and local law enforcement agencies; (3) to persons having a
material interest; (4) to committees of Congress; (5) to the President and certain other persons;
(6) to federal officers and employees for tax administration; (7) to federal officers and employ-
ees for administration of non-tax-related federal laws; (8) to the Bureau of the Census and Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis for statistical use; (9) for tax administration purposes; (10) for pur-
poses other than tax administration; (11) to assist in identifying the taxpayer for certain
purposes; (12) to certain persons in connection with the maintenance of tax administration; and
(13) with respect to taxes imposed by Subtitle E and Chapter 35. Each of the thirteen circum-
stances also has its own set of requirements. For example:
(d) Disclosure to State tax officials and State and local law enforcement agencies
(1) In general
Returns and return information ... shall be open to inspection by, or disclo-
sure to, any State agency, body, or commission, or its legal representative, which is
charged under the laws of such State with responsibility for the administration of
State tax laws for the purpose of, and only to the extent necessary in, the admini-
stration of such laws .... Such inspection shall be permitted, or such disclosure
made, only upon written request by the head of such agency, body, or commission,
and only to the representatives of such agency, body, or commission designated in
such written request .... Such representatives shall not include any individual
who is the chief executive officer of such State .... However, such return informa-
tion shall not be disclosed to the extent that the Secretary determines that such
disclosure would identify a confidential informant or seriously impair any civil or
criminal tax investigation.
Id. § 6103(d)(1).
16. See id. § 7213. The statute imposes criminal liability for willful disclosures of tax infor-
mation in a manner unauthorized by statute. See id. § 7213(a)(1). Unlawful disclosure is a felony
punishable by a maximum fine of $5,000 and imprisonment not to exceed five years, plus the
costs of prosecution. See id. If the offense is committed by an officer or employee of the United
States, that officer or employee will be dismissed from his position. See id.
17. Civil liability is imposed for willful or negligent unauthorized disclosures. See id.
§ 7431(a). Liability obligates the defendant to pay the costs of the action plus the greater of
$1,000 per unauthorized disclosure or the sum of actual damages and, in the case of willful or
gross negligence, punitive damages. See id § 7431(c). There is no liability for disclosures that are
the result of "a good faith but erroneous interpretation of section 6103." Id. § 7431(b). This
means that "[g]ood faith i assumed if the statute is ambiguous, and case law either does not
cover the point or arguably supports disclosure." Ridgeley A. Scott, Suing the IRS and Its Em-
ployees for Damages: David and Goliath, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 507, 531 (1996).
18. See, e.g., Rowley v. United States, 76 F.3d 796, 799-802 (6th Cir. 1996); Mallas v. United
States, 993 F.2d 1111, 1117-23 (4th Cir. 1993); Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 901-06 (10th Cir.
1983).
19. Compare Rowley, 76 F.3d at 801 (holding that return information that is filed and re-
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Courts of Appeal have adopted different approaches to the problem.
The Sixth and Ninth Circuits look to see if the disclosed tax informa-
tion has lost its confidentiality.20 Based on this analysis, these circuits
reason that tax information that is part of a public record is no longer
confidential and, thus, loses its § 6103 protection. In contrast to this
approach, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits look at the literal language
of § 6103. Because § 6103 has no public records exception to its non-
disclosure norm, these circuits conclude that tax information in a
public record is still protected by § 6103 and any subsequent disclo-
sures of that information violate § 6103.22 Not to be outdone, the Sev-
enth and Fifth Circuits have also considered the issue73 These circuits
focus on the source of the information disclosed. If the disclosure is
taken directly from a public record, the disclosure does not contain
tax information as statutorily defined and § 6103 is not violated.24
However, if the disclosure comes directly from tax information, then
§ 6103 is violated regardless of whether the disclosure is also part of a
public record.25
The resolution of this issue has far-reaching implications if one
considers the answer's potential effect on taxpayer compliance.
2 6 If
courts create judicial exceptions to § 6103, taxpayers may not comply
with tax laws because their tax information will not be protected from
governmental abuse.2 1 On the other hand, if the IRS is prevented
from publicizing any tax information taken from any source, it may be
corded as part of a judicial lien loses its confidentiality and is not protected by § 6103); and
Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that return information dis-
closed in a judicial proceeding loses its § 6103 protection) with Mallas, 993 F.2d at 1121 (holding
that the IRS violated § 6103 by issuing revenue agent reports to investors containing return in-
formation revealed in a judicial proceeding); and Rodgers, 697 F.2d at 906 (holding that an IRS
agent violated § 6103 by revealing return information he previously disclosed while giving testi-
mony in court).
20. See Rowley, 76 F.3d at 801; Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338.
21. See Rowley, 76 F.3d at 801; Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338.
22- See Mallas, 993 F.2d at 1120; Rodgers, 697 F.2d at 906.
23. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997); Thomas v. United States, 890
F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1989).
24. See Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1324; Thomas, 890 F.2d at 21.
25. See Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1325-26.
26. Noncompliance, of course, results in large sums of unpaid taxes to the United States. In
1996, approximately $200 billion in unpaid federal taxes were outstanding. See Adam Melita,
Note, Much Ado About $26 Million: Implications of Privatizing the Collection of Delinquent
Federal Taxes, 16 VA. TAX REV. 699, 710 (1997).
27. See American Bar Ass'n, Report and Recommendations on Taxpayer Compliance, 41
TAX LAW. 329, 356 (1988) ("The Internal Revenue Service has been, and must continue to be,
sensitive to this fundamental aspect of the American compact between citizens and the govern-
ment. As the amount and diversity of information received by the Service increases, the need to
protect confidentiality will become even greater than it is today.").
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unable to deter noncompliance. 28 The legislative history of § 6103 in-
dicates that Congress was aware of these concerns and sought to bal-
ance them in § 6103 in order to maximize taxpayer compliance.
2 9
However, both § 6103 and its legislative history are silent as to
whether tax information that is part of a public record loses its § 6103
protection. Thus, a uniform interpretation of § 6103 is needed not
simply for uniformity's sake, but for the effect on taxpayer compli-
ance.
This note explores each circuit's approach to the public records
problem and its possible effect on taxpayer compliance. Part I pro-
vides the history of § 6103 with an emphasis on the legislative purpose
behind the 1976 amendments to § 6103. Part II outlines the split in the
circuits according to the three approaches the circuits have taken: the
confidentiality approach, the disclosure approach, and the source ap-
proach.30 Because the Fifth Circuit's recent decision is the most com-
prehensive analysis of the public record disclosure dilemma to date,
this note discusses its opinion in detail. In Part III, the note critiques
each approach in light of the legislative and political history behind
§ 6103. It concludes that the "source" approach of the Seventh and
Fifth Circuits is the best approach because it effectuates the purpose
behind § 6103 without imposing a judicially created exception on
§ 6103.
I. BACKGROUND TO § 6103
A. The Law Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976
The controversy surrounding the confidentiality of tax informa-
tion is not new in the United States. As early as 1862, Congress
promulgated legislation that allowed for the open inspection of tax
information by the public and government. 31 Presumably this was
done with the assumption that compliance would be increased if
"each citizen knew the details of others' returns. 3 2 Despite this legis-
28. See id. at 350-51 (noting that fear of punishment is a factor in encouraging compliance);
Leo P. Martinez, Federal Tax Amnesty: Crime and Punishment Revisited, 10 VA. TAX REV. 535,
572-73 (1991).
29. See S. REP. No. 94-938, at 317-18 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N 3439, 3746-47.
30. See Michael G. Little, Extra-Judicial Discussion of Taxpayer Information: The IRS
Bully Is Still on the Block, 43 FLA. L. REV. 1041, 1048-49 (1991) (classifying the cases as the
"lost confidentiality cases" and the "disclosure cases"). Subsequent to Little's article, the Fifth
Circuit has also ruled on the public records exception. See Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1307.
31. See S. DOc. No. 94-266, at 835 (1975).
32. Id. at 1020.
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lation, the Commissioner only allowed Internal Revenue officials ac-
cess to tax information.3 3 Access was limited, according to the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, so that the income tax "'might not be felt to be
inquisitorial."314
In 1864, Congress enacted legislation that expressly allowed for
the disclosure of tax information in response to the Commissioner's
limitations.3" The country's newspapers responded by publishing
United States citizens' incomes, while also criticizing the new legisla-
tion.36 As a result, in 1870, Congress forbade the disclosure of tax in-
formation.
37
Although the income tax was abolished in 1872, upon re-
enactment in 1894, Congress maintained an antidisclosure position.38
The Tariff Act of 1913 somewhat modified Congress' position by
stating that returns shall "'constitute public records"' but can only be
inspected by "'the order of the President, under rules and regulations
to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury and approved by
the President.' ' 39 By 1924, however, Congress once again vacillated
and ordered the Commissioner to publish the names, addresses, and
incomes of all persons filing an income tax return.40 This requirement
was loosened in 1926 when Congress simply required that the Com-
missioner publish a list with the names and addresses of all income
tax filers.41
In 1936, Congress expanded on these requirements when it
passed a "pink slip" requirement. 42 This mandate obligated taxpayers
to fill out a slip that was open to the public, containing their "gross in-
come, total deductions, net income and tax payable. ' 43 However, the
pink slip requirement was quickly repealed after taxpayer uproar.44
33. See id. at 835.
34. Id. (quoting Report of the Secretary of the Treasury on the State of the Finances for the
Year Ending June 30, 1863).
35. See id. at 836.
36. See id. at 837.
37. See id. at 837-38. Congress did allow the disclosure of tax information for statistical
purposes. See id. at 838. Thus, as early as 1870, Congress implicitly seemed to acknowledge the
massive amount of important information to which the Internal Revenue Service was and is
privy.
38. See Christina N. Smith, Note, The Limits of Privatization: Privacy in the Context of Tax
Collection, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 627, 642 (1997).
39. S. Doc. No. 94-266, at 842 (quoting the Tariff Act of 1913, ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114 (1913)).
40. See id. at 843.
41. See Smith, supra note 38, at 642-43.
42. See id. at 643.
43. S. DOc. No. 94-266, at 843.
44. See Smith, supra note 38, at 643.
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With this repeal, the tax disclosure beast went into a forty-year hiber-
nation.
B. The Tax Reform Act of 1976
1. Events Leading to Change
The break-in at the Watergate Hotel on June 17, 1972, and its
implications alerted Congress to the need to protect the information
collected from United States citizens by the federal government.
4
The IRS was of particular concern to Congress because of the amount
of sensitive information that the public voluntarily discloses to it.4
6
The massive amount of information the IRS possessed caused many
other agencies to turn to the IRS for information to be used for non-
tax purposes.47 Yet, before the amendments to § 6103, adequate safe-
guards for tax information were not in place. The regulations con-
cerning the availability of tax information did require the requesting
agency to state the reasons for the request, but this requirement often
resulted in ambiguous statements that amounted to nothing more
than conclusions. 48 For instance, a request for tax information by the
U.S. Customs Service simply stated that the information was re-
quested "'[i]n connection with an official matter before this Service
involving the collection of customs duties.' ''49
Governmental agencies were not the only ones who could and
did access tax information for nontax purposes. Presidential admini-
strations have used tax information for political purposes since World
War 1.50 President Nixon's administration was no exception. In fact, it
was his administration's abuses that brought the disclosure issue back
into the public eye.5 One such misuse involved President Nixon's po-
litical strategists' desire to see gubernatorial candidate George
Wallace defeated in the Alabama primary for the Democratic nomi-
45. See MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, IRS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 4.06, at 4-56 (2d ed.
1991).
46. See S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 316 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3746 (not-
ing that "the IRS probably has more information about more people than any other agency in
the country").
47. See id. at 317-18, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3746-47.
48. See S. DOC. NO. 94-266, at 856-57.
49. Id. at 857 (quoting request by U.S. Customs Service).
50. See BURNHAM, supra note 7, at 228 (noting that confidential government documents
reveal that officials in the Franklin Delano Roosevelt administration "did not hesitate to mobi-
lize the tax agency in efforts to destroy the careers of individuals they had decided were ene-
mies").
51. See id. at 254.
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nation.12 It was believed that a defeat in Alabama would lessen
Wallace's chances of being elected President in 1972.53 Thus, when
White House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman saw a confidential report
that Wallace was under investigation by the IRS, he obtained a copy
of the IRS report and subsequently ensured that parts of it would be
published nationally before the Alabama primary.5 4 Abuses such as
this formed part of the basis for the House Judiciary Committee's im-
peachment resolution. Article II of the House Judiciary Committee's
Articles of Impeachment charged that President Nixon, "'acting per-
sonally and through his subordinates and agents,"' attempted to ob-
tain tax information from the IRS for unauthorized purposes and
caused discriminatory tax audits and tax investigations.55
The enactment of the Privacy Act of 197456 prevented some of
these abuses but did not "focus on the unique aspects of tax re-
turns. '51 Thus after forty years, Congress once again considered the
impact of the disclosure of tax information.5 8 Recognizing that abu-
sive disclosures of tax information by the government threaten tax-
payer compliance, Congress amended § 6103 to generally prohibit the
disclosure of tax information.59
2. Legislative History
The legislative history of § 6103 indicates that Congress amended
the statute because of the abuses of tax information and their effect
on taxpayer compliance. Congress believed that these "potential and
actual disclosures" breach taxpayer privacy which, in turn, could have
a negative effect on "our country's very successful voluntary assess-
ment system which is the mainstay of the Federal tax system." 6 If the
country's citizens do not trust that the government will not abuse
their tax information, the "uniquely successful" voluntary system will
be threatened. 61 Taxpayer compliance would decrease.
52. See id. at 250.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 249-50 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 93-1305, at 3 (1974)).
56. See Pub. L. No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552a
(1994)).
57. S. REP. No. 94-938, at 318 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3747.
58. See STAFF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 94TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1976, at 314 (1976).
59. See Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 1202, 90 Stat. 1520, 1667 (1976) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. § 6103 (1994)).
60. S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 317, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747.
61. See 122 CONG. REC. S24,013 (1976) (statement of Sen. Weicker).
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Fearing this decrease in taxpayer compliance, Congress sought to
"balance the particular office or agency's need for the information in-
volved with the citizen's right to privacy and the related impact of the
disclosure upon the continuation of compliance with our country's
voluntary assessment system. '62 Based on this balance, it was decided
that "returns and return information should generally be treated as
confidential and not subject to disclosure except in those limited
situations delineated in... section 6103.
'63
Congress amended § 6103 with the purpose of preventing the
"potential and actual disclosure" of tax information that threatens
taxpayer compliance. The goal of encouraging taxpayer compliance is
accomplished by treating tax information as confidential and by lim-
iting disclosure except where statutorily authorized. It is with this
purpose in mind that § 6103 must be interpreted.
II. THE CIRCUITS' VARIOUS APPROACHES
The Federal Courts of Appeal differ on the methodology used to
determine the question of whether tax information that becomes part
of a public record and has, thus, arguably lost its confidentiality, also
loses its statutory protection. 64 When faced with this question, the
courts developed three different approaches to determine if the oth-
erwise statutorily unauthorized disclosure of tax information already
contained in a public record also violates § 6103. These approaches
are the confidentiality approach, the disclosure approach, and the
source approach. 65
A. The Confidentiality Approach
Under the confidentiality approach, the court focuses on the con-
fidentiality of the tax information. The court asks whether the statu-
torily unauthorized disclosure consisted of tax information that is part
of a public record and thus is no longer confidential. According to this
approach, if the tax information has lost its confidentiality, subse-
quent disclosure does not violate § 6103.66 Therefore, under the confi-
62. S. REP. No. 94-938, at 318, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747.
63. Id.
64. See Allan Karnes & Roger Lirely, Striking Back at the IRS: Using Internal Revenue
Code Provisions to Redress Unauthorized Disclosures of Tax Returns or Return Information, 23
SETON HALL L. REV. 924,935-40 (1993).
65. See Little, supra note 30, at 1048-58 (discussing confidentiality and disclosure ap-
proaches).
66. See, e.g., Rowley v. United States, 76 F.3d 796, 801 (6th Cir. 1996); William E. Schram-
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dentiality approach, a judicial exception to § 6103 is created.
The confidentiality approach is predicated on the belief that the
purpose of § 6103 is to protect confidential tax information. 67 If the
tax information is no longer confidential, § 6103's protection is lost
and the statute cannot be violated. 68 Thus, as the Ninth Circuit stated,
"A prerequisite to liability ... is the confidentiality of the disclosed
information." 69
In Lampert v. United States,70 the Ninth Circuit decided three
consolidated appeals7 dealing with government press releases con-
taining tax information that had previously been disclosed in public
judicial proceedings. 72 In each case, the taxpayer alleged that the dis-
closure of the tax information in the form of a press release was unau-
thorized and violated § 6103.71 In turn the government argued that the
press releases did not violate § 6103 because they contained informa-
tion disclosed in public judicial proceedings. 74 Alternatively, the gov-
ernment argued that even if the disclosures were unauthorized, liabil-
ity was precluded because the tax information was disclosed based on
a good faith interpretation of § 6103.71 The government's summary
judgment motion prevailed in all three cases, and the taxpayers ap-
pealed.
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that the press releases contained
return information as defined by § 6103(b) and that the disclosure of
the return information in the judicial proceeding was authorized un-
der § 6103(h)(4)(A).7 6 It acknowledged that a "strict, technical read-
bling Accountancy Corp. v. United States, 937 F.2d 1485, 1488-89 (9th Cir. 1991): Lampert v.
United States, 854 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988).
67. See, e.g., Lampert, 854 F.2d at 337.
68. See Rowley, 76 F.3d at 801; Schrambling, 937 F.2d at 1490.
69. Schrambling, 937 F.2d at 1488.
70. 854 F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1988).
71. See Peinado v. United States, 669 F. Supp. 953 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Figur v. United States,
662 F. Supp. 515 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Lampert v. United States, 87-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) $ 9361,
at 87,872 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
72. See Lampert, 854 F.2d at 336. In Peinado, the U.S. Attorney's Office disclosed tax in-
formation in two press releases: one stated Peinado pleaded guilty to the crime of tax evasion;
the other announced his sentence. See id. In Figur, the U.S. Attorney's Office's press release
summarized tax evasion charges filed against Figur. See id. In Lampert, the U.S. Attorney's Of-
fice and the IRS issued press releases that described their investigation of the defendants and
the government's filing of an action to obtain an injunction against the defendants' advertise-




76. See id. at 336-37. I.R.C. section 6103(h)(4)(A) (1994) states:
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ing of the statute supports the taxpayers' position" that the subse-
quent disclosure of tax information in the form of press releases was
not authorized by § 6103.77 However, the court stated that the purpose
of § 6103 is to prohibit the disclosure of confidential tax information,
not to prohibit public disclosure of tax information.78 Because the tax
information in this case was disclosed in a judicial forum, the court
held that it lost its confidentiality and in turn lost its § 6103 protec-
tion.79 The court stated that to give effect to the literal language of
§ 6103 would undermine its purpose of protecting confidential infor-
mation.80 Thus, the Ninth Circuit created a judicial exception to
§ 6103 and held that the press releases did not violate the statute.
81
The government's summary judgment motions were affirmed.
Three years later, in William E. Schrambling Accountancy Cor-
poration v. United States,82 the Ninth Circuit again faced the problem
of an authorized disclosure of tax information that was then disclosed
in a manner unauthorized by statute.83 This case was the consolidation
(h) Disclosure to certain Federal officers and employees for purposes of tax admini-
stration, etc.
(4) Disclosure in judicial and administrative tax proceedings
A return or return information may be disclosed in a Federal or State judicial
or administrative proceeding pertaining to tax administration, but only [if]-
(A) the taxpayer is a party to the proceeding, or the proceeding arose
out of, or in connection with, determining the taxpayer's civil or criminal li-
ability, or the collection of such civil liability, in respect of any tax imposed
under this title ....
77. See Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338. The Ninth Circuit had previously observed in Stokwitz v.
United States, 831 F.2d 893, 896 (9th Cir. 1987), that § 6103 does not create "a general prohibi-
tion against public disclosure of tax information." In Stokwitz, the office and briefcase of a ci-
vilian attorney employed by the United States Navy had been searched by his supervisor, secre-
tary, and assistant after he had been accused of "misconduct." See id. at 893. The search
produced, among other things, Stokwitz's copies of his tax returns for 1982 and 1983. See id.
These personal copies were subsequently disclosed to Naval Investigative Service agents and
other Navy employees. See id. Stokwitz brought suit against the United States, the Department
of Justice, and the Department of the Navy claiming that the disclosures violated § 6103. See id.
at 893-94. The Ninth Circuit held that the disclosures did not violate § 6103 because § 6103 "ap-
plies only to information filed with and disclosed by the IRS, and Stokwitz's tax returns were
not obtained directly or indirectly from the IRS." Id. at 897. Thus, the Stokwitz Court stated
that even though § 6103 applies to employees of the United States, it only applies to them to the
extent that they receive tax information from the IRS. See id. at 896 n.4.
78. See Lampert, 854 F.2d at 338.
79. See id.
80. See id. ("We believe that Congress sought to prohibit only the disclosure of confidential
tax information.").
81. See id. ("[W]e hold that once return information is lawfully disclosed in a judicial fo-
rum, its subsequent disclosure by press release does not violate the Act."). Because the court
held that the press releases did not violate § 6103, it did not reach the government's alternate
argument regarding the good faith exception of § 7431. See id. at 336.
82. 937 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1991).
83. See id. at 1488.
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of two cases on appeal.84 The issue the Ninth Circuit faced was
whether several improper notices of levy containing tax information
violated § 6103 when the information had previously been disclosed
in a tax lien in one case and a bankruptcy petition in the other case.85
Relying on its decision in Lampert, the Ninth Circuit again empha-
sized its position that the issue is whether the tax information dis-
closed was confidential.8 6 The court stated that this inquiry is neces-
sary because if the tax information is no longer confidential, no
violation of § 6103 can occur.87 Applying this reasoning, the court held
that because a tax lien and a bankruptcy petition are part of the pub-
lic domain, the tax information contained in them lost its confidenti-
ality.88 Therefore, no violation of § 6103 had occurred.89
The Sixth Circuit, in Rowley v. United States,90 when confronted
with an authorized disclosure of tax information followed with a
statutorily unauthorized disclosure, also focused on the issue of confi-
dentiality and created a judicial exception to § 6103. In Rowley, the
IRS had lawfully filed and recorded a federal lien against the taxpay-
ers.91 Subsequent to the lien, the IRS levied and seized a cabin be-
longing to the taxpayers. 92 In order to sell the property, the IRS
placed an advertisement in a newspaper that disclosed the taxpayers'
names, a description of the property, and the reason for the seizure.93
84. See id. at 1486-88.
85. See id. The IRS may disclose tax information to establish liens or levies. See I.R.C.
§§ 6321, 6331 (1994); Treas. Reg. § 301.6103(k)(6)-l(b)(6) (1998). In one of the cases before the
court, the William E. Schrambling Accountancy Corporation was delinquent in filing income tax
returns and paying employment taxes. See Schrambling, 937 F.2d at 1486. The IRS properly de-
livered a Final Notice and Demand as required by I.R.C. § 6331(d) and sent notices of levy to
banks regarding the tax periods in the Final Notice and Demand. See id. Later, the IRS issued
77 more notices of levy that included tax information (in the form of additional tax periods and
taxes owed) not included in the Final Notice and Demand. See id. These improper notices of
levy, issued in violation of § 6331(d), contained tax information previously disclosed in a federal
tax lien. See id.
In the other case before the court, the taxpayer disclosed tax information in a bankruptcy
petition. See id. at 1488. Subsequent to the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings the IRS issued
three levies, two in violation of 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (1994) and one in violation of I.R.C.
§ 6331. See Schrambling, 937 F.2d at 1487. These improper levies contained tax information dis-
closed in the bankruptcy proceedings. See id. at 1488.
86. See Schrambling, 937 F.2d at 1488 ("Disclosure of return information that is not confi-
dential does not violate section 6103.").
87. See id.
88. See id. at 1489-90.
89. See id. at 1490.
90. 76 F.3d 796 (6th Cir. 1996).
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Based on these facts, the Sixth Circuit held that tax information
lawfully disclosed through the filing and recording of a lien, which is
then part of the public domain, loses its confidentiality and is not pro-
tected by § 6103.94 Thus, the IRS' advertisements containing the pre-
viously disclosed tax information did not violate § 6103.91 The court
noted that this approach retains "the proper balance between a tax-
payer's reasonable expectation of privacy and the government's le-
gitimate interest in disclosing tax return information to the extent
necessary for tax administration functions." 96
B. The Disclosure Approach
Under the disclosure approach, § 6103 is read as generally pro-
hibiting the disclosure of tax information unless authorized by stat-
ute.97 Here, the relevant inquiry is not whether the information dis-
closed is confidential, but whether the disclosure violates the
language of § 6103.98 Under this approach, it is irrelevant that the tax
information disclosed is part of a public record.9  In accord with
§ 6103's purpose, tax compliance is encouraged by assuring taxpayers
that their tax information will not be disclosed unless authorized by
statute. 100
In Rodgers v. Hyatt,0 the Tenth Circuit was faced with a situa-
tion wherein Hyatt, then Chief of the Criminal Investigation Division,
Office of the District Director, Colorado District of the IRS, testified
at a hearing to enforce an IRS summons issued to a bank in connec-
tion with the tax liabilities of the taxpayers. 02 At the hearing, Hyatt
94. See id. at 801. The Sixth Circuit distinguished liens from judicial proceedings in that the
purpose of recording a federal tax lien is to give public notice "and is thus qualitatively different
from disclosures made in judicial proceedings, which are only incidentally made public." Id. This
statement implies that the Sixth Circuit left open the question of whether an unauthorized dis-
closure of tax information that was previously disclosed in a judicial proceeding violates § 6103.
This is in contrast to the Ninth Circuit, which has held that tax information disclosed lawfully in
liens or judicial proceedings loses its § 6103 protection because in either case the tax informa-
tion is no longer confidential. See Schrambling, 937 F.2d at 1489; Lampert v. United States, 854
F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988).
95. See Rowley, 76 F.3d at 802. Because the court found that the disclosures did not violate
§ 6103, it did not reach the issues of whether improper levies give rise to § 7431 liability or if the
good faith exception of § 7431(b) applied. See id.
96. Id.
97. See Mallas v. United States, 993 F.2d 1111, 1120 (4th Cir. 1993).
98. See Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 906 (10th Cir. 1983).
99. See id.
100. See Mallas, 993 F.2d at 1121.
101. 697 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1983).
102. See id. at 900. Hyatt was subpoenaed as a witness by the taxpayers. See id.
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testified that based on allegations from the FBI and local law en-
forcement agencies, the IRS believed that the taxpayers had not re-
ported income obtained from stolen oil.103 One month later, Hyatt,
while continuing the investigation of the taxpayers, disclosed to the
officers of a corporation that had done business with the taxpayers
that the IRS had heard "rumors and allegations" that the taxpayers
were involved in an oil theft ring.104 The taxpayers claimed that this
disclosure was unauthorized under § 6103; the IRS argued that
Hyatt's disclosure to the officers was already part of a public record
and no longer confidential and, thus, § 6103 could not be violated."°5
The court rejected this argument, stating that the confidentiality of
the tax information was not the issue; the issue was whether the dis-
closure was authorized by statute. 1° Because Hyatt's second disclo-
sure was not authorized by statute, the court held that the IRS vio-
lated § 6103.101
The Fourth Circuit, in Mallas v. United States,1 8 held that the
purpose behind § 6103 is to prevent IRS disclosure in order to in-
crease full taxpayer compliance. 19 In Mallas, two investment counsel-
103. See id. Hyatt also testified that the IRS was investigating the taxpayers for the accuracy
of income tax due and owing for a number of years and that the IRS suspected that the tax-
payer's returns were not correct. See id. Interestingly, all this information was elicited by the
taxpayer's attorney. See id. (noting that "[t]his testimony was elicited, we repeat, by counsel for
Taxpayer").
104. See id. at 904-05. IRS employees may disclose information for investigative purposes.
The statute states:
An internal revenue officer or employee may, in connection with his official duties re-
lating to any audit, collection activity, or civil or criminal tax investigation or any other
offense under the internal revenue laws, disclose return information to the extent that
such disclosure is necessary in obtaining information, which is not otherwise reasona-
bly available, with respect to the correct determination of tax, liability for tax, or the
amount to be collected or with respect to the enforcement of any other provision of
this title. Such disclosures shall be made only in such situations and under such condi-
tions as the Secretary may prescribe by regulation.
I.R.C. § 6103(k)(6) (1994). Here, however, the court held that the disclosure by Hyatt did not
fall under this exception because the disclosure is only allowable "'to the extent ... necessary in
obtaining information."' Rodgers, 697 F.2d at 904 (alteration in original) (quoting I.R.C.
§ 6103(k)(6)). The taxpayer's counsel pointed out that if Hyatt had raised the issue of the ru-
mors to gain information regarding the oil theft ring, he would have followed the statement by
asking the officers of the company if they knew where the taxpayers allegedly received their oil.
See id. at 905.
105. See Rodgers, 697 F.2d at 906.
106. See id.
107. See id. ("Even assuming the loss of confidentiality in the content of the statements, we
hold that the April 5, 1979, disclosure was clearly unauthorized.").
108. 993 F.2d 1111 (4th Cir. 1993).
109. See id. at 1121 ("The plain purpose of section 6103 is to encourage full compliance with
the tax laws by assuring taxpayers that the IRS will not disclose the information provided to it in
confidence.").
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ors were convicted of fraud and tax evasion. 110 The IRS then sent
Revenue Agent Reports ("RARs") to investors in the counselors' tax
shelter."' The RARs described the counselors' "financing scheme"
and convictions and informed the investors that deductions for their
losses through the shelter were disallowed."' The court held that
without specific statutory authorization, the disclosure of tax informa-
tion is prohibited under § 6103.113 Because the RARs disclosed tax in-
formation in a manner not authorized by statute, the IRS violated
§ 6103114 and was liable for damages under § 7431.115 The court noted
that it is for Congress to balance the privacy of tax information with
the government's interest in disclosing tax information for administra-
tive purposes.116 While the court acknowledged that the RARs con-
tained tax information not previously disclosed, it held that "even to
the extent that the RARs repeated information otherwise available to
the public" they still violated § 6103.117
C. The Source Approach
The source approach was originally espoused by Judge Richard
Posner of the Seventh Circuit in Thomas v. United States.118 There, the
taxpayer contested a deficiency assessed by the IRS which was upheld
by the United States Tax Court.119 The IRS then issued a press release
which contained tax information that had been disclosed in court.120
110. See id. at 1114. The investment counselors were indicted on 35 counts of fraud and tax
evasion and a jury convicted them on 14 of the counts. See id. These convictions were subse-
quently reversed by the Fourth Circuit. See id. at 1115.
111. See id. at 1114-15. Though not an explicit factor in the decision, it is interesting to note
that the IRS continued to send the same RARs even after the Fourth Circuit reversed the coun-
selors' convictions. See id. at 1115.
112. See id. at 1114-15.
113. See id. at 1120.
114. See id. at 1118; see also id. at 1120 (noting that no exception permits the disclosure of
tax information "simply because it is otherwise available to the public"). The court also rejected
the IRS' contention that the RARs fell under the exception in § 6103(h)(4)(C) because the sec-
tion's plain language does not authorize the disclosure of audits. See id. at 1121. Section
6103(h)(4) states in pertinent part that tax information may be disclosed in a "judicial or ad-
ministrative proceeding pertaining to tax administration" if the tax information "directly relates
to a transactional relationship between a person who is a party to the proceeding and the tax-
payer which directly affects the resolution of an issue in the proceeding." I.R.C. § 6103(h)(4),
(h)(4)(C) (1994).
115. See Mallas, 993 F.2d at 1124.
116. See id. at 1121.
117. Id.
118. 890 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1989).
119. See id. at 19. The Tax Court also punished the taxpayer by awarding damages due to
the frivolousness of the taxpayer's suit. See id.
120. See id. The press release was sent to the taxpayer's hometown newspaper and was sub-
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The taxpayer claimed that the press release violated § 6103.21 The
IRS countered that the taxpayer waived the confidentiality of the tax
information by contesting the assessment in court and, therefore, the
press release did not violate § 6103.122
The Seventh Circuit stated that it did not need to decide if the
IRS's argument was valid.123 Instead, the court looked at the source of
the disclosed tax information.2 4 Here, the immediate source of the tax
information disclosed was "a public document [the Tax Court opin-
ion] lawfully prepared by an agency that is separate from the Internal
Revenue Service and has lawful access to tax returns."1 Because the
source of the tax information disclosed in the press release was not
tax information as defined by § 6103(b)(2),'2 6 § 6103 was not vio-
lated. 127 Although the IRS may not disclose tax information, it may
publicize Tax Court opinions.128 Thus, the court held that it need "not
take sides in the conflict between the Ninth and Tenth Circuits over
whether the disclosure of return information in a judicial record bars
the taxpayer from complaining about any subsequent disclosure," be-
cause the IRS can publicize the court opinion. 2 9 The court pointed
out that to hold that the IRS cannot publicize court opinions could
conflict with the First Amendment.
130
The most recent decision to endorse the source approach is
Johnson v. Sawyer."' In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit considered
whether two IRS press releases containing tax information violated
§ 6103 when the tax information had previously been disclosed law-
fully in a judicial opinion and was part of a public record. 32 In this
sequently published. See id.




125. Id. at 21. Presumably the "lawful access to tax returns" the Seventh Circuit refers to is
the access contained in § 6103(h)(4)(A). See supra note 76.
126. See supra note 14.
127. See Thomas, 890 F.2d at 21.
128. See id. The court stated that the IRS could publicize a Tax Court opinion just as the
President of the United States could read a Tax Court opinion to a nationwide audience to dis-
courage noncompliance. See id. This statement is true even though as an official of the United
States, the President is subject to § 6103. See id.
129. Id. at 20. The court noted that this opinion in no way changed its stance that the statute
is a 'general prohibition against the disclosure of tax return information unless expressly
authorized by an exception."' Id. at 21 (quoting Wiemerslage v. United States, 838 F.2d 899, 902
(7th Cir. 1988)).
130. See id.
131. 120 F.3d 1307 (5th Cir. 1997).
132. See id. at 1310-12. This was the second time the Fifth Circuit ruled on an appeal arising
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case, the press releases publicized the taxpayer's plea of guilty to the
charge of federal tax evasion.133 The Fifth Circuit refused to create
any exceptions to § 6103.134 Instead, the court held that if the source of
an unauthorized disclosure is tax information as defined by § 6103,
then the statute is violated regardless of whether the disclosed infor-
mation has "arguably" lost its confidentiality. 35 However, unlike the
previous cases that applied the disclosure approach, the Fifth Circuit
stated that when the IRS discloses information taken directly from a
public record, § 6103 is not violated.136 Thus, the Fifth Circuit com-
bined the disclosure approach of the Fourth and Tenth Circuits with
the source approach of the Seventh Circuit.'37
In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit pointed out that all the circuits con-
cur that § 6103, on its face, does not permit the disclosure of tax in-
formation because it has lost its confidentiality. 13 8 With this in mind,
the court stated that when the language of the statute is clear, it is or-
dinarily "'conclusive." ' 139 This is true unless the plain language of the
statute would lead to results that were not intended by Congress.
40
The court stated that although it may initially appear that Congress
did not intend for § 6103 to protect tax information that has been
previously disclosed in a public record, the other provisions of the
statute, as well as the legislative history, indicate otherwise.
4'
Looking at the other provisions of § 6103, the Johnson court ob-
served that § 6103(p) establishes safeguards that certain federal agen-
cies must abide by when the IRS lawfully discloses tax information to
them. 42 These safeguards "'shall cease to apply with respect to any
from the IRS' press releases regarding the taxpayer. See id. at 1309. Previously, the Fifth Circuit
reversed and remanded for dismissal a $10 million Federal Tort Claims Act judgment against
the United States. See id. The taxpayer then sought relief against the IRS employees who re-
leased the information in the press releases and obtained a $9 million jury verdict. See id. The
IRS employees appealed and the parties appeared before the Fifth Circuit again. See id.
133. See id. at 1311. Though not relevant to the § 6103 issue, one of the press releases also
contained erroneous information. See id. at 1312.
134. See id. at 1318.
135. See id. at 1323.
136. See id. at 1321 n.1, 1324.
137. See id. at 1318 (noting that the court is following the approach of the Fourth and Tenth
Circuits, "modified by the Seventh Circuit's 'source' analysis").
138. See id. at 1319 (citing Mallas v. United States, 993 F.2d 1111, 1120 (4th Cir. 1993);
Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18, 20 (7th Cir. 1989); Lampert v. United States, 854 F.2d
335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988); Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 906 (10th Cir. 1983)).
139. Id. (quoting Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)).
140. See id.
141. See id. at 1319-23.
142. See id. at 1320. The opinion succinctly sums up the safeguards federal agencies must
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return or return information if, and to the extent that, such return or
return information is disclosed in the course of any judicial or admin-
istrative proceeding and made a part of the public record thereof.' '1 43
The court stated that this does not mean that the IRS can disclose tax
information when it becomes part of the public record.144 This is not
an exception to the general rule prohibiting disclosure. 145 Instead, the
Johnson court stated that this indicates that Congress considered the
possibility of tax information becoming part of a public record and
yet did not create an exception to the general rule prohibiting disclo-
sure. 146
The court observed that another provision of § 6103 permits the
IRS to disclose tax information to the media under certain condi-
tions.147 This is permitted for the purpose of "'notifying persons enti-
tled to tax refunds when the Secretary, after reasonable effort and
lapse of time, has been unable to locate such persons. ' '" 148 The court
stated that this provision indicates that Congress did not unintention-
ally omit an exception allowing the IRS to disclose tax information
that is part of a public record to the media.149
The Johnson court also stated that the legislative history indi-
cates that there should not be a "public records" exception to § 6103.
Despite the fact that the Senate Finance Committee stated that § 6103
"'balance[d] the particular office or agency's need for the information
involved with the citizen's right to privacy and the related impact of
the disclosure upon the continuation of compliance with our country's
voluntary assessment system,"' Congress did not create an exception
for tax information contained in a public record.15 0 Because Congress
balanced these concerns and did not create a public records excep-
tion, the court said that the judiciary should not now create an excep-
follow when the IRS discloses tax information to them. The agencies must: "(1) establish a sys-
tem of records to keep track of all disclosure requests, the date of request, and the reason for
the request; (2) establish a secure area in which to store the information; and (3) restrict the ac-
cess of persons to that information." Id.
143. Id. (quoting I.R.C. § 6103(p)(4) (1994)).
144. See id. at 1320-21.
145. See id. at 1321.
146. See id.
147. See id. (referring to I.R.C. § 6103(m)). Section 6103(m) permits disclosure to "the press
and other media." I.R.C. § 6103(m)(1).
148. Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1321 (quoting I.R.C. § 6103(m)(1)).
149. See id.
150. See id. at 1322 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-938, at 318 (1976), re-
printed in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3747).
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tion to the nondisclosure norm.'51
Furthermore, the legislative history, according to the Fifth Cir-
cuit, indicates that the issue is not the confidentiality of the tax infor-
mation disclosed; the issue is whether the disclosure violated § 6103.152
The court noted that § 6103 states that "'[rieturns and return informa-
tion shall be confidential, and except as authorized by this title"' shall
not be "'disclose[d],"' and does not say that "'[confidential] [r]eturns
and return information ... shall [not be] disclose[d].'15 3 The court
also noted that the legislative history states that "'returns and return
information should generally be treated as confidential.'1 5 4 Thus,
based on the provisions of § 6103 and the legislative history, the court
concluded that § 6103 was enacted to prevent disclosure of all return
information; not just confidential tax information.'55 The court was
careful to note that, despite this conclusion, it was "not holding that
the IRS, or any other federal agency, is prohibited from publishing
the contents of a public record, such as a judicial opinion... provided
it is the public record that is the immediate source.'15 6 Instead, "§ 6103
is violated only when tax return information-which is not a public
record open to public inspection-is the immediate source of the in-
formation claimed to be wrongfully disclosed. ' 157 Because the source
of the information contained in the Johnson press releases was tax re-
turn information and not the public record, the IRS violated § 6103.158
III. ANALYSIS
The argument among the circuits is whether § 6103 was enacted
to protect only confidential tax information or all tax information. 159
Although the confidentiality approach has some merit,' 6° a close in-
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting I.R.C. § 6103(a)).
154. Id. at 1322 n.2 (alteration in original) (quoting S. REP. No. 94-938, at 318, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747).
155. See id. at 1323.
156. Id. at 1321 n.1.
157. Id. at 1324.
158. See id. at 1325-26. The IRS employees gathered the tax information for the press re-
leases from the taxpayer's return file or information collected by IRS agents, not from a public
record. See id. at 1325.
159. But see Little, supra note 30, at 1062 (arguing that confidentiality and disclosure "go
hand-in-hand" because the purpose of the statute is to prevent government abuses of tax infor-
mation).
160. See Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1319 (noting that finding a violation of § 6103 for information
that has been previously disclosed in a judicial proceeding initially appears to be an "absurd re-
sult"); J. Hudson Duffalo, Comment, The Buttoned Lip: The Controversy Surrounding the Dis-
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spection of the language of § 6103 and the legislative and political his-
tory surrounding the amendments to it reveals that the source ap-
proach reflects the purpose behind § 6103. In other words, this ap-
proach will ensure taxpayer compliance, Congress' primary concern
when enacting § 6103.
A. Section 6103's Protection Is Not Limited
The confidentiality approach's flaw is that it presupposes that the
purpose behind § 6103 is to protect only confidential tax information.
This allows the courts and government to determine if an item is con-
fidential and, based on this determination, possibly disclose it without
violating § 6103. The plain language of § 6103 does not support this
contention. Instead, § 6103 says that "returns and return information
shall be confidential ... and shall [not be] disclose[d]" except as
authorized by statute.161 This means that the government has no
choice: 62 tax information is confidential and cannot be disclosed, ex-
cept as authorized by statute. As the Supreme Court has stated,
§ 6103 lists what tax information the IRS "is compelled to keep confi-
dential" and, thus, cannot disclose. 163
The structure of § 6103 also indicates that it was not designed to
protect only confidential tax information. Section 6103 creates a gen-
eral prohibition against the disclosure of tax information' 64 and then
goes on to state the exceptions to this general rule with great specific-
ity. 65 However, none of these exceptions includes a public records ex-
ception. The Federal Courts of Appeals do not differ on this issue.166
Despite this fact, the Sixth Circuit found that creating a judicial ex-
ception "strikes the proper balance between a taxpayer's reasonable
expectation of privacy and the government's legitimate interest in
disclosing tax return information to the extent necessary for tax ad-
closure of Tax Return Information, 53 ALB. L. REv. 937, 963 (1989) (arguing "[b]ecause there is
no interest in maintaining confidentiality once information has entered the public record, the
general prohibition against disclosure should not apply to nonconfidential information").
161. I.R.C. § 6103(a) (1994) (emphasis added).
162. See BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1375 (6th ed. 1990) ("Shall. As used in statutes ... this
word is generally imperative or mandatory.").
163. See Church of Scientology v. Internal Revenue Serv., 484 U.S. 9, 15 (1987) (emphasis
added).
164. See I.R.C. § 6103(a); Wiemerslage v. United States, 838 F.2d 899, 902 (7th Cir. 1988).
165. See I.R.C. § 6103(c)-(o).
166. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1319 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Mallas v. United
States, 993 F.2d 1111, 1120 (4th Cir. 1993); Rodgers v. Hyatt, 697 F.2d 899, 906 (10th Cir. 1983)).
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ministration functions."16 But Congress balanced these concerns
when it amended § 6103 to prohibit disclosure except in thirteen
specified circumstances. 168 Courts should apply this balance as re-
flected in § 6103. The confidentiality approach creates a new balance.
The legislative history also indicates that § 6103's protection is
not limited to confidential tax information. Congress amended § 6103
at a time when abuses of tax information by the government were
thrust into the public limelight. It had enacted the Privacy Act of
1974, but recognized that tax information required special attention. 169
This need for attention was further exemplified by the fact that Con-
gress had not considered the disclosure of tax information for forty
years. 70 Yet, despite all the consideration that went into amending
§ 6103, Congress did not create a public records exception. A judicial
exception for public records changes the legislative scheme that Con-
gress carefully planned and usurps legislative power.1
71
The Senate's Report states that tax information "should gener-
ally be treated as confidential.' 1 72 The Report goes on to state that "as
a general rule returns and return information are to be confiden-
tial."'173 Thus, again it appears that the government has no choice but
to treat all tax return information as confidential-whether it is or
not-and not disclose it unless expressly permitted to do so by stat-
ute.
This blanket provision against disclosure was enacted because
Congress feared that abuses of tax information by governmental
agencies would jeopardize the voluntary assessment system. 74 The
fear was based on the belief that the "actual and potential disclosure
of return and return information to other Federal and State agencies
for nontax purposes" breaches the privacy expectations of taxpay-
ers.' 7' This breach of privacy negatively impacts taxpayer compliance.
167. Rowley v. United States, 76 F.3d 796, 802 (6th Cir. 1996).
168. See S. REP. No. 94-938, at 318 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3747; Mal-
las, 993 F.2d at 1121.
169. See S. REP. No. 94-938, at 318, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747.
170. See id. at 317, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3746.
171. See Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1322 ("'The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if
they should be disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would
equally be the substitution of their pleasure [for] that of the legislative body."' (alteration in
original) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1961))).
172. S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 318, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 318, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3748 (emphasis added).
174. See id. at 317, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747.
175. See id. (emphasis added).
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The use of the word "potential" in the legislative history is significant
because the nondisclosure norm of § 6103 ensures taxpayers that
there will not be any actual disclosure of their tax information and
that there is no potential that their tax information will be unilaterally
disclosed by the IRS unless statutorily authorized. The potential for
disclosure is limited to the statutorily authorized exceptions. The fact
that tax information will not be disclosed unless statutorily authorized
ensures that taxpayers' expectations of privacy are met and because
these expectations are met, taxpayer compliance is encouraged.
A judicially created confidentiality exception threatens taxpay-
ers' privacy expectations. IRS disclosure of tax information will no
longer be limited to statutory exceptions. Taxpayer's tax information
will potentially be disclosed by the unilateral actions of the IRS. In
William E. Schrambling Accountancy Corporation v. United States,
17 6
the Ninth Circuit stated that "[a] prerequisite to liability ... is the
confidentiality of the disclosed information." '177 If this statement is
correct, the judicially created exception might not be limited to tax
information that is part of the public domain. The IRS could use its
discretion and disclose tax information that it believed is not confi-
dential. The IRS could avoid liability for this disclosure even if a
court determines that the information is confidential by claiming that
the disclosure was based on a good faith interpretation of § 6103.178
The discretion to disclose tax information is put back into the hands
of the IRS. Congress did not intend to give the IRS such wide discre-
tion. Instead, Congress chose to prohibit the disclosure of all tax in-
formation in order to prevent the government from determining
which items should be kept confidential. 119 The confidentiality ap-
proach ignores Congress' clear and deliberate choice to prohibit dis-
176. 937 F.2d 1485 (9th Cir. 1991).
177. Id. at 1488.
178. See I.R.C. § 7431(b) (1994). The good faith defense will be easier to claim in a confi-
dentiality approach jurisdiction because good faith is assumed if case law "arguably supports
disclosure." Scott, supra note 17, at 531.
179. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1322 (5th Cir. 1997). Not only did Congress de-
cide to generally prohibit the disclosure of tax information, Congress has now also decided to
provide civil damages for unauthorized negligent or willful inspection of tax information and
criminal penalties for the unauthorized willful inspection of tax information. See Taxpayer
Browsing Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-35, 111 Stat. 1104 (1997) (codified as amended at
I.R.C. §§ 7213, 7213a, 7431). The legislative history behind this Act also reflects Congress' fear
that taxpayer compliance will decrease if tax information is abused by the IRS. See 143 CONG.
REC. H1463 (1997) (statement of Rep. Johnson) ("The American public's willingness to provide
the Federal Government with sensitive personal information on their tax returns each year de-
pends on the confidence that the people have that this information will be held in the strictest
confidence.").
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closure. The confidentiality approach will have a negative effect on
taxpayer compliance and undermine the purpose of § 6103.180
The confidentiality approach also ignores the fact that informa-
tion that is part of a public record does not necessarily lose its confi-
dentiality.181 To the contrary, a public record is not "known to the
whole world.' ' 82 An individual may still have a privacy interest in a
public document and want to prevent its further dissemination.183 This
is apparent in the situation where a taxpayer gives an IRS official
consent to disclose some of the taxpayer's tax information to a con-
gressional committee hearing. After the hearing, the IRS cannot re-
peat the disclosures given during the hearing because the consent ex-
tended only to the hearing;18' thus, even though a congressional
committee heard the tax information, the IRS cannot further dis-
seminate the information because the taxpayer still has a privacy in-
terest in it. However, the confidentiality approach seems to assume
that tax information that is disclosed to, or accessible by, more than
one person is no longer confidential."8
B. The Disclosure Approach: Close, but Not Perfect
The disclosure approach reflects Congress' desire to encourage
taxpayer compliance by increasing confidence in the voluntary as-
sessment system. As previously noted, prior to 1976 Congress had not
considered the tax information disclosure issue for forty years. 86 As
abuses by the federal government came to light, 87 Congress began to
fear that taxpayer confidence in the voluntary tax assessment system
would begin to wane. 88 Because taxpayer confidence in the fairness of
180. See Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1322.
181. See id. at 1323.
182. Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18, 21 (7th Cir. 1989).
183. See United States Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489
U.S. 749, 770 (1989) (interpreting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1988)).
184. See IRS Fact Sheet 97-12, reprinted in 97 TNT (Tax Analysts) 185-24 (Sept. 24, 1997).
185. See, e.g., Rowley v. United States, 76 F.3d 796, 801 (6th Cir. 1996); Lampert v. United
States, 854 F.2d 335, 338 (9th Cir. 1988).
186. See S. REP. No. 94-938, at 317 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3746.
187. See id. at 317, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3746 ("[Qluestions recently have been raised with
respect to disclosure of tax information to the White House. Apparently, tax information was
transmitted to the White House on a number of well known individuals. Also, tax returns have
been provided White House employees in previous administrations.").
188. See id. at 317, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747 (the disclosure of tax information on the part of
the government "has raised the question of whether the public's reaction to this possible abuse
of privacy would seriously impair the effectiveness of our country's very successful voluntary
assessment system which is the mainstay of the Federal tax system").
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the tax system affects taxpayer compliance, 189 Congress amended
§ 6103 to prevent the government from disclosing tax information ex-
cept where outlined by statute. Therefore, it is unlikely that Congress
intended to protect only confidential tax information in light of the
abuses it was trying to ameliorate and its concerns about taxpayer
compliance. Instead, as the Supreme Court stated in a different con-
text, the primary purpose of the amendment to § 6103 was to prohibit
access to tax information except in limited statutory circumstances.19
By limiting access to tax information, Congress sought to encourage
taxpayer compliance.191 To create a judicial exception to § 6103 would
be to usurp legislative authority.192
When applying the disclosure approach, the Fourth Circuit
stated: "The plain purpose of section 6103 is to encourage full com-
pliance with the tax laws by assuring taxpayers that the IRS will not
disclose the information provided to it in confidence. '1 93 While the
disclosure approach as applied by the Fourth and Tenth Circuits en-
courages taxpayer compliance by ensuring that the IRS will not dis-
close tax information, it fails to allow the IRS to encourage taxpayer
compliance by publicizing judicial opinions. Under the disclosure ap-
proach, the IRS is prevented from publicizing successful criminal tax
prosecutions whether it acquires its information from tax information
or from a judicial opinion. This prohibition prevents the IRS from
telling its side of the story and deterring noncompliance. Because the
disclosure approach does not allow the IRS to increase taxpayer
compliance by publicizing judicial proceedings in a nonabusive man-
ner, it fails to fully effectuate the purpose behind § 6103.
The disclosure approach may also run afoul of the First Amend-
ment. In Cox Broadcasting Corporation v. Cohn, 94 the Supreme
Court faced a situation where a reporter broadcast the name of a rape
victim despite a Georgia statute that prohibited the publication of a
rape victim's name.1 95 The reporter had obtained the name from judi-
cial records which were open to public inspection.196 The Court em-
phasized that the media is relied on to report governmental proceed-
189. See American Bar Ass'n, supra note 27, at 351.
190. See Church of Scientology v. Internal Revenue Serv., 484 U.S. 9, 15 (1987).
191. See Mallas v. United States, 993 F.2d 1111, 1121 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that § 6103 de-
fines disclosure broadly to further this purpose).
192. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1322 (5th Cir. 1997).
193. Mallas, 993 F.2d at 1121.
194. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
195. See id. at 471-74.
196. See id. at 491.
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ings and, "[w]ith respect to judicial proceedings in particular, the
function of the press serves to guarantee the fairness of trials and to
bring to bear the beneficial effects of public scrutiny upon the admini-
stration of justice."' 97 Based on this reasoning, the Court held that a
state may not "impose sanctions on the publication of truthful infor-
mation contained in official court records.' 1 98 Although the holding of
Cox may be limited to its factual context, the disclosure approach
could collide "with the policies that animate the free-speech clause of
the First Amendment."' 199 This is an unnecessary problem that can be
avoided. The source approach spares the tax information disclosure
conundrum any more controversy by taking it out of the world of the
First Amendment. 2°°
C. The Source Approach: Perfection
The source approach reflects the purpose behind § 6103 by de-
terring noncompliance while maintaining the trust of American tax-
payers. Under the source approach, the IRS is allowed to "trumpet its
victory" 201 as long as the source of the publicity is part of a public rec-
ord or the public domain. 2° This publicity acts as a deterrent to tax-
payers who may not otherwise comply with the tax system and thus
aids the IRS in administering our tax laws. 20 3 If courts prevent the IRS
from publicizing tax information taken directly from a judicial pro-
ceeding, our system of voluntary compliance will be jeopardized be-
cause the IRS will be unable to deter noncompliance.
Although compliance is not accomplished solely through deter-
197. Id. at 492.
198. Id. at 495.
199. Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18, 21 (7th Cir. 1989).
200. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1324 (5th Cir. 1997) ("Because under our analy-
sis, § 6103 is violated only when tax return information-which is not a public record open to
public inspection-is the immediate source of the information claimed to be wrongfully dis-
closed, the First Amendment concerns in Cox Broadcasting are not implicated here."); Thomas,
890 F.2d at 21 ("Nothing in the background of the statute suggests so broad a scope as Thomas
is urging and so direct a collision with the policies that animate the free-speech clause of the
First Amendment.").
201. Thomas, 890 F.2d at 21.
202. See Johnson, 120 F.3d at 1324. While the Fifth Circuit has stated that the IRS is not
prohibited from publishing the contents of a public record if the source of the publication is a
public record, see id. at 1321 n.1, 1324, the Seventh Circuit's holding was limited to the situation
of the IRS publishing a judicial proceeding, see Thomas, 890 F.2d at 21. However, because of
the Seventh Circuit's concern over avoiding a "collision" with the First Amendment, it seems
that the Seventh Circuit's reasoning would allow the IRS, or any other federal agency, to publi-
cize a public record that is not a judicial opinion.
203. See Martinez, supra note 28, at 572-73.
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rence, 204 the source approach also encourages taxpayer compliance
because the taxpayer will know that the tax information provided to
the government will not be subject to abuse-a major factor that af-
fects the compliance of taxpayers205 and one that concerned Congress
when enacting § 6103.206 Allowing the IRS to publicize information
obtained from a judicial opinion does not jeopardize taxpayers' view
that tax information will not be subject to abuse because, in contrast
to the confidentiality approach, the IRS will not be able to disclose
tax information it unilaterally determines is not confidential. 27 No
new rights are created for the IRS. Instead, the IRS may only publi-
cize public records. Taxpayers' privacy expectations in tax informa-
tion are preserved and, because of this, taxpayer compliance is en-
couraged. 2 8 Like the pure disclosure approach, the source approach
encourages taxpayer compliance because taxpayers' tax information
will be protected. However, unlike the pure disclosure approach, the
source approach also encourages taxpayer compliance because the
IRS can publicize court opinions. The source approach accomplishes
both these assurances of taxpayer compliance without giving the IRS
discretion to disclose tax information it has decided is no longer con-
fidential.
The source approach does place the taxpayer in the position of
choosing between litigating a civil liability and not having private in-
formation disclosed, but this choice is made all the time in other areas
of the law. When litigating any matter, the potential for the disclosure
of embarrassing facts is always present. Litigating a tax liability is no
different. No matter what the issue, the judicial proceeding becomes
part of a public record open to inspection. 2°9 If the taxpayer wants to
protect the tax information disclosed in a judicial proceeding, a pro-
tective order may be requested.
210
Although under the source approach an improper levy that dis-
closes information taken directly from a properly issued public lien
204. See American Bar Ass'n, supra note 27, at 348.
205. See id. at 351.
206. See S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 317 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3439, 3747.
207. Trust is essential in maintaining a successful voluntary assessment system. As Senator
Weicker remarked in 1976 when praising the amendments to § 6103, "[Tlhe American system of
Internal Revenue is uniquely successful; its success flies in the face of the experience of most
nations of the world, and throughout the history of the world.... I attribute this to one central
fact: trust." 122 CONG. REc. S24,013 (1976).
208. See S. REP. NO. 94-938, at 318, 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3747.
209. See Thomas v. United States, 890 F.2d 18, 21 (7th Cir. 1989).
210. See Little, supra note 30, at 1069-70.
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may not violate § 6103, the IRS will be subject to sanctions for the
improper levy.21' Civil damages are available for unauthorized collec-
tion actions.2 2 Even under the source approach, the IRS will not be
able to escape liability for any abusive improper levies.
Based on the above analysis, the source approach most com-
pletely effectuates the purpose behind § 6103. Although the differ-
ences between the source approach, the disclosure approach, and the
confidentiality approach are subtle, they are important for two rea-
sons. First, unlike the confidentiality approach, the source approach
does not create a judicial exception to § 6103. The IRS is not given
any new rights and is unable to argue that § 6103 is not violated be-
cause an item of tax information has lost its confidentiality. Taxpay-
ers' privacy expectations are maintained and taxpayer compliance is
encouraged. Second, unlike the disclosure approach, the source ap-
proach does not have the potential to run afoul of the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment. The source approach allows the IRS
to publicize information taken directly from a judicial opinion, thus
deterring noncompliance. The source approach encourages taxpayer
compliance in a fair and nonabusive manner and in this way reflects
the purpose behind § 6103.
CONCLUSION
After neglecting the issue of tax information disclosure for forty
years, Congress amended § 6103 with the Tax Reform Act of 1976.
The amendments prohibit the disclosure of tax information subject to
thirteen statutory exceptions. Congress felt these amendments were
necessary to ensure taxpayers of the privacy of their tax information
211. Of course an improper lien will violate § 6103 because it will not be publicizing infor-
mation taken from a public record.
212. See I.R.C. § 7433(a) (1994). That section provides:
(a) In general
If, in connection with any collection of Federal tax with respect to a taxpayer, any
officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service recklessly or intentionally disre-
gards any provision of this title, or any regulation promulgated under this title, such
taxpayer may bring a civil action for damages against the United States in a district
court of the United States. Except as provided in section 7432 [Civil damages for fail-
ure to release lien], such civil action shall be the exclusive remedy for recovering dam-
ages from such actions.
Damages available are the lesser of $100,000 or "the sum of-(1) actual, direct economic dam-
ages sustained by the plaintiff as a proximate result of the reckless or intentional actions of the
officer or employee, and (2) the costs of the action." Id. § 7433(b). To recover damages the suc-
cessful plaintiff must have exhausted all administrative remedies available. See id. § 7433(d)(1).
The damages are further reduced by the amount a plaintiff could have reasonably mitigated. See
id. § 7433(d)(2).
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and, thus, encourage compliance with tax laws. However, the Federal
Courts of Appeal have disagreed whether lawfully disclosed tax in-
formation that becomes part of the public record loses its § 6103 pro-
tection even though § 6103 does not contain a public records excep-
tion. This disagreement must be resolved because of its potential
negative effect on taxpayer compliance.
If judicial exceptions to § 6103 are created, taxpayer compliance
may decrease because taxpayers will see § 6103's protection eroded.
On the other hand, if the IRS is not allowed to publicize its cases that
are part of a public record, it may not be able to deter noncompli-
ance. Thus, a uniform interpretation of § 6103 as applied to tax in-
formation in public records is needed. Thus far, three approaches to
this problem have surfaced in the circuits: the confidentiality ap-
proach, the disclosure approach, and the source approach.
Under the confidentiality approach, as espoused by the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits, the focus is on whether the disclosed information has
lost its confidentiality. The circuits following this approach have held
that when tax information becomes part of a public record, it loses its
confidentiality and, thus, loses its § 6103 protection.213 Because a pub-
lic records exception is not found in § 6103, a judicial exception is cre-
ated.
The disclosure approach, as followed by the Fourth and Tenth
Circuits, focuses on the language and the purpose of § 6103. These
courts hold that because the literal language of § 6103 does not con-
tain a public records exception, tax information that is part of a public
record does not lose its § 6103 protection.2 14 This approach empha-
sizes that the purpose of § 6103 is to increase taxpayer compliance by
"assuring taxpayers that the IRS will not disclose the information pro-
vided to it in confidence.""2 5 However, this approach is flawed in that
in its pure form, the IRS is prevented from disclosing tax information
taken directly from public records. Thus, the IRS cannot deter non-
compliance by publicizing its victories.
The recent decision in Johnson v. Sawyer presents the most logi-
cal solution to the controversy surrounding the "public records" ex-
ception to § 6103. Following the lead of the Seventh Circuit, the Fifth
213. See Rowley v. United States, 76 F.3d 796, 799-801 (6th Cir. 1996); Lampert v. United
States, 854 F.2d 335,338 (9th Cir. 1988).
214. See Mallas v. United States, 993 F.2d 1111, 1117-23 (4th Cir. 1993); Rodgers v. Hyatt,
697 F.2d 899, 906 (10th Cir. 1983).
215. Mallas, 993 F.2d at 1121.
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Circuit looked at the source of the tax information disclosed.216 This
approach, labeled herein as the source approach, refuses to create a
judicial exception to § 6103. But, unlike the disclosure approach, this
approach does not eliminate the possibility of the IRS publicizing its
victories. As the Fifth and Seventh Circuits pointed out, if the IRS
discloses information taken directly from a public record and not
from statutorily defined tax information, § 6103 is not violated. This
approach avoids facing a possible constitutional question while en-
couraging full compliance with our voluntary assessment system. The
goal of taxpayer compliance is accomplished by ensuring taxpayers
that tax information will not be disclosed unless authorized by statute,
while at the same time allowing the IRS to publicize its cases and de-
ter potential noncompliance. The source approach furthers the goals
of § 6103. Tax information maintains its veil of confidentiality. As the
1975 Report on Administrative Procedures of the Internal Revenue
Service states, if the veil "is to be lifted, Congress should do so.
'
217
216. See Johnson v. Sawyer, 120 F.3d 1307, 1323 (5th Cir. 1997).
217. S. Doc. No. 94-266, at 1023 (1975).
